Chapter 53 The shapley value

Eyal Winter*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

239 Scopus citations

Abstract

This chapter surveys some of the literature in game theory that has emerged from Shapley's seminal paper on the Value. The survey includes both contributions which offer different interpretations of the Shapley value as well as several different ways to characterize the value axiomatically. The chapter also surveys some of the literature that generalizes the notion of the value to situations in which a priori cooperation structure exists, as well as a different literature that discusses the relation between the Shapley value and models of non-cooperative bargaining. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the applied side of the Shapley value, primarily in the context of cost allocation and voting.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationHandbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
EditorsRobert Aumann, Sergiu Hart
Pages2025-2054
Number of pages30
DOIs
StatePublished - 2002

Publication series

NameHandbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
Volume3
ISSN (Print)1574-0005

Keywords

  • Shapley value
  • coalitions
  • cooperation structures
  • cooperative games
  • voting

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