Character (Alone) Doesn't count: Phenomenal character and narrow intentional content

Preston J. Werner*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Proponents of phenomenal intentionality share a commitment that, for at least some paradigmatically intentional states, phenomenal character constitutively determines narrow intentional content. if this is correct, then any two states with the same phenomenal character will have the same narrow intentional content. using a twin- earth style case, i argue that two different people can be in intrinsically identical phenomenological states without sharing narrow intentional contents. After describing and defending the case, i conclude by considering a few objections that help to further illustrate the problem.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)261-271
Number of pages11
JournalAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
Issue number3
StatePublished - 1 Jul 2015
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.


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