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Cheap talk in games with incomplete information
Elchanan Ben-Porath
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Corresponding author for this work
Department of Economics
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peer-review
54
Scopus citations
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Business & Economics
Bayesian Games
100%
Games with Incomplete Information
97%
Cheap Talk
90%
Communication Equilibrium
59%
Sequential Equilibrium
49%
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
48%
Announcement
30%
Communication
20%