Classical Cooperative Theory II: Value-Like Concepts

Sergiu Hart

Classical Cooperative Theory II: Value-Like Concepts

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

The Value is a solution concept originally due to Shapley (1953). The idea behind the concept is to evaluate how much will a player be willing to pay to participate in a given game. It seeks to represent what the game is worth for a player. In some sense the value captures the expected outcome of the game. We will start with the TU (transferable utility) framework and the axiomatic approach and then consider various extensions to the NTU (non transferable utility) case.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches
Editors	Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell
Place of Publication	Berlin, Heidelberg
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Pages	43-49
Number of pages	7
ISBN (Print)	978-3-642-60454-6
State	Published - 1997

Publication series

Name	NATO ASI series. Series F, Computer and systems sciences
Publisher	Springer
Volume	155

Cite this

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Classical Cooperative Theory II: Value-Like Concepts. / Hart, Sergiu.
Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches. ed. / Sergiu Hart; Andreu Mas-Colell. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. p. 43-49 (NATO ASI series. Series F, Computer and systems sciences; Vol. 155).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Classical Cooperative Theory II: Value-Like Concepts

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