Abstract
Avoidance of certain pieces of information, i.e. ignoring the consequences of one's choices for the well-being of others, has been shown to enhance selfishness. We argue that preferences for uncertainty or deliberate ignorance can also be employed by those seeking to behave pro-socially. We use a dictator game with hidden pay-offs for the dictators and allow participants to reveal their own pay-offs without a cost before making their allocation choice. We observe that a non-trivial fraction of participants do not reveal their pay-offs and choose the allocation that benefits others.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 54-56 |
| Number of pages | 3 |
| Journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 153 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Apr 2017 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2017 Elsevier B.V.
Keywords
- Deliberate ignorance
- Moral wiggle room
- Pro-social behavior
- Self-image