Coalitional skill games

Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

57 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs), a simple model of cooperation among agents. This is a restricted form of coalitional games, where each agent has a set of skills that are required to complete various tasks. Each task requires a set of skills in order to be completed, and a coalition can accomplish the task only if the coalition's agents cover the set of required skills for the task. The gain for a coalition depends only on the subset of tasks it can complete. We consider the computational complexity of several problems in CSGs, for example, testing if an agent is a dummy or veto agent, computing the core of the game or testing whether the core is empty, and finding the Shapley value or Banzhaf power index of agents.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2008
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages1005-1012
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)9781605604701
StatePublished - 2008
Event7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2008 - Estoril, Portugal
Duration: 12 May 200816 May 2008

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume2
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2008
Country/TerritoryPortugal
CityEstoril
Period12/05/0816/05/08

Keywords

  • Computational complexity
  • Cooperative game theory

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