Cognitive biases and moral luck

David Enoch*, Ehud Guttel

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

Some of the recent philosophical literature on moral luck attempts to make headway in the moral-luck debate by employing the resources of empirical psychology, in effect arguing that some of the intuitive judgments relevant to the moral-luck debate are best explained - and so presumably explained away - as the output of well-documented cognitive biases. We argue that such attempts are empirically problematic, and furthermore that even if they were not, it is still not at all clear what philosophical significance they would have.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)372-386
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Moral Philosophy
Volume7
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Sep 2010

Keywords

  • COGNITIVE BIAS
  • DEBUNKING EXPLANATION
  • MORAL LUCK

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