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Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities

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161 Scopus citations

Abstract

In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such buyers. The valuations of such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of valuations that exhibit no complementarities, a hierarchy that includes also OR and XOR combinations of singleton valuations, and valuations satisfying the gross substitutes property. While we show that the allocation problem among valuations with decreasing marginal utilities is NP-hard, we present an efficient greedy 2-approximation algorithm for this case. No such approximation algorithm exists in a setting allowing for complementarities. Some results about strategic aspects of combinatorial auctions among players with decreasing marginal utilities are also presented.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEC'01
Subtitle of host publicationProceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Pages18-28
Number of pages11
ISBN (Print)9781581133875
DOIs
StatePublished - 14 Oct 2001
Event3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2001 - Tampa, FL, United States
Duration: 14 Oct 200117 Oct 2001

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Conference

Conference3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2001
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityTampa, FL
Period14/10/0117/10/01

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