Communication in repeated games with private monitoring

Elchanan Ben-Porath*, Michael Kahneman

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

62 Scopus citations

Abstract

The paper considers repeated games where each player can be observed by only a subset of the other players, and where players can make public announcements about the behavior of the players they observed. We address the following question: What is the minimal level of observability that is required to obtain efficient outcomes? The main result is that the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs, when the discount factor tends to one, contains the set of individual rational payoffs whenever each player is observed by at least two other players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C73.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)281-297
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume70
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1996
Externally publishedYes

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