TY - JOUR
T1 - Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
AU - Ben-Porath, Elchanan
AU - Kahneman, Michael
PY - 1996/8
Y1 - 1996/8
N2 - The paper considers repeated games where each player can be observed by only a subset of the other players, and where players can make public announcements about the behavior of the players they observed. We address the following question: What is the minimal level of observability that is required to obtain efficient outcomes? The main result is that the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs, when the discount factor tends to one, contains the set of individual rational payoffs whenever each player is observed by at least two other players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C73.
AB - The paper considers repeated games where each player can be observed by only a subset of the other players, and where players can make public announcements about the behavior of the players they observed. We address the following question: What is the minimal level of observability that is required to obtain efficient outcomes? The main result is that the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs, when the discount factor tends to one, contains the set of individual rational payoffs whenever each player is observed by at least two other players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C73.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0030210113&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1996.0090
DO - 10.1006/jeth.1996.0090
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AN - SCOPUS:0030210113
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 70
SP - 281
EP - 297
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 2
ER -