Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions

Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

100 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper studies auctions in a setting where the different bidders arrive at different times and the auction mechanism is required to make decisions about each bid as it is received. Such settings occur in computerized auctions of computational resources as well as in other settings. We call such auctions, on-line auctions. We first characterize exactly on-line auctions that are in- centive compatible, i.e. where rational bidders are always motivated to bid their true valuation. We then embark on a competitive worst-case analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. We obtain several results, the cleanest of which is an incentive compatible on-line auction for a large number of identical items. This auction has an optimal competitive ratio, both in terms of seller's revenue and in terms of the total social e ciency obtained.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationEC 2000 - Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages233-241
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781581132724
DOIs
StatePublished - 17 Oct 2000
Event2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2000 - Minneapolis, United States
Duration: 17 Oct 200020 Oct 2000

Publication series

NameEC 2000 - Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Conference

Conference2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2000
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityMinneapolis
Period17/10/0020/10/00

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2000 ACM. All rights reserved.

Cite this