TY - GEN
T1 - Competitive spectrum sharing in symmetric fading channel with incomplete information
AU - Noam, Yair
AU - Leshem, Amir
AU - Messesr, Hagit
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - This paper considerers a symmetric Gaussian interference game with incomplete information where players choose between frequency division multiplexing (FDM) and full spread (FS) of their transmit power. Previously, the only known Nash equilibrium point for this game was the point where players mutually choose FS and interfere with each other. This point may lead to undesirable outcome from global network point of view and even for each user individually. It happens when mutual FDM is better to both users than mutual FS. In this paper, we show that if users agree to use different subbands in the case of FDM, then there exist a non pure-FS Nash equilibrium point, i.e. an equilibrium point where players choose FDM for some channel realizations and FS for the others. This Nash equilibrium point increases each user's throughput and therefore improves the spectrum utilization. Furthermore, to reach this point, the only instantaneous channel state information (CSI) required by each user is its interference-to-signal ratio.
AB - This paper considerers a symmetric Gaussian interference game with incomplete information where players choose between frequency division multiplexing (FDM) and full spread (FS) of their transmit power. Previously, the only known Nash equilibrium point for this game was the point where players mutually choose FS and interfere with each other. This point may lead to undesirable outcome from global network point of view and even for each user individually. It happens when mutual FDM is better to both users than mutual FS. In this paper, we show that if users agree to use different subbands in the case of FDM, then there exist a non pure-FS Nash equilibrium point, i.e. an equilibrium point where players choose FDM for some channel realizations and FS for the others. This Nash equilibrium point increases each user's throughput and therefore improves the spectrum utilization. Furthermore, to reach this point, the only instantaneous channel state information (CSI) required by each user is its interference-to-signal ratio.
KW - Bayesian games
KW - Interference channel
KW - Spectrum management
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=78049405154&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICASSP.2010.5496128
DO - 10.1109/ICASSP.2010.5496128
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AN - SCOPUS:78049405154
SN - 9781424442966
T3 - ICASSP, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing - Proceedings
SP - 2998
EP - 3001
BT - 2010 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2010 - Proceedings
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2010 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2010
Y2 - 14 March 2010 through 19 March 2010
ER -