Complex cooptation: How regime complexity affects the stability of cooptation bargains—the case of China and the World Bank

How do variations in regime complexity affect the overall stability of cooptation bargains amidst shifting great power rivalries? Increased complexity creates opportunities for institutional bargaining during cooptation deal negotiations, enabling cooptees to explore outside-options, engage in regime-shifting and countervailing institutional creation. While great power dynamics influence actors’ decisions regarding cooptation deals, regime complexity shapes their ability to employ cross-institutional strategies, affecting deal stability. Focusing on China's cooptation deal with the World Bank since 1980, we find that during the Cold War, the deal remained stable due to China's limited outside-options and significant power asymmetry with the US. In the post-Cold War era, increased complexity offered China with only limited outside-options, while it could not effectively engage in regime-shifting. The establishment of the AIIB, however, threatens the stability of the cooptation deal made in the World Bank by providing China with genuine orum-shopping and regime-shifting opportunities. This analysis highlights how regime complexity and power dynamics interact to affect cooptation bargain stability amid evolving global rivalries.