Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections

Reshef Meir; Ariel D. Procaccia; Jeffrey S. Rosenschein; Aviv Zohar

doi:10.1613/jair.2566

Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections

Reshef Meir^*
, Ariel D. Procaccia
, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
, Aviv Zohar

^*Corresponding author for this work

The Rachel and Selim Benin School of Engineering and Computer Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

95 Scopus citations

Abstract

Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections of an assembly or committee. In this paper, we characterize the worst-case complexity of manipulation and control in the context of four prominent multi-winner voting systems, under different formulations of the strategic agent's goal.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	149-178
Number of pages	30
Journal	Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Volume	33
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.2566
State	Published - 2008

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title = "Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections",

abstract = "Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections of an assembly or committee. In this paper, we characterize the worst-case complexity of manipulation and control in the context of four prominent multi-winner voting systems, under different formulations of the strategic agent's goal.",

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AB - Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections of an assembly or committee. In this paper, we characterize the worst-case complexity of manipulation and control in the context of four prominent multi-winner voting systems, under different formulations of the strategic agent's goal.

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Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections

Abstract

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