Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects

Dave Buchfuhrer*, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

24 Scopus citations

Abstract

The Combinatorial Public Projects Problem (CPPP) is an abstraction of resource allocation problems in which agents have preferences over alternatives, and an outcome that is to be collectively shared by the agents is chosen so as to maximize the social welfare. We explore CPPP from both computational perspective and a mechanism design perspective. We examine CPPP in the hierarchy of complement free (subadditive) valuation classes and present positive and negative results for both unrestricted and truthful algorithms.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationEC'10 - Proceedings of the 2010 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Pages33-42
Number of pages10
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'10 - Cambridge, MA, United States
Duration: 7 Jun 201011 Jun 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Conference

Conference11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'10
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityCambridge, MA
Period7/06/1011/06/10

Keywords

  • algorithmic mechanism design

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