TY - GEN
T1 - Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects
AU - Buchfuhrer, Dave
AU - Schapira, Michael
AU - Singer, Yaron
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - The Combinatorial Public Projects Problem (CPPP) is an abstraction of resource allocation problems in which agents have preferences over alternatives, and an outcome that is to be collectively shared by the agents is chosen so as to maximize the social welfare. We explore CPPP from both computational perspective and a mechanism design perspective. We examine CPPP in the hierarchy of complement free (subadditive) valuation classes and present positive and negative results for both unrestricted and truthful algorithms.
AB - The Combinatorial Public Projects Problem (CPPP) is an abstraction of resource allocation problems in which agents have preferences over alternatives, and an outcome that is to be collectively shared by the agents is chosen so as to maximize the social welfare. We explore CPPP from both computational perspective and a mechanism design perspective. We examine CPPP in the hierarchy of complement free (subadditive) valuation classes and present positive and negative results for both unrestricted and truthful algorithms.
KW - algorithmic mechanism design
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77954719030&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/1807342.1807348
DO - 10.1145/1807342.1807348
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AN - SCOPUS:77954719030
SN - 9781605588223
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
SP - 33
EP - 42
BT - EC'10 - Proceedings of the 2010 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
T2 - 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'10
Y2 - 7 June 2010 through 11 June 2010
ER -