Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games

Yoram Bachrach*, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

33 Scopus citations


We consider a simple model of cooperation among agents called Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs). This is a restricted form of coalitional games, where each agent has a set of skills that are required to complete various tasks. Each task requires a set of skills in order to be completed, and a coalition can accomplish the task only if the coalition's agents cover the set of required skills for the task. The gain for a coalition depends only on the subset of tasks it can complete. We consider the computational complexity of several problems in CSGs, such as testing if an agent is a dummy or veto agent, computing the core and core-related solution concepts, and computing power indices such as the Shapley value and Banzhaf power index.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)1-21
Number of pages21
JournalArtificial Intelligence
StatePublished - 2013

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was partially supported by Israel Science Foundation grant # 898/05 , by Israel Ministry of Science and Technology grant # 3-6797 , and by the Google Inter-University Center for Electronic Markets and Auctions .


  • Coalitional game theory
  • Core
  • Power indices


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