Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games

Yoram Bachrach; David C. Parkes; Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

doi:10.1016/j.artint.2013.07.005

Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games

Yoram Bachrach^*, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

^*Corresponding author for this work

The Rachel and Selim Benin School of Engineering and Computer Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

35 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a simple model of cooperation among agents called Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs). This is a restricted form of coalitional games, where each agent has a set of skills that are required to complete various tasks. Each task requires a set of skills in order to be completed, and a coalition can accomplish the task only if the coalition's agents cover the set of required skills for the task. The gain for a coalition depends only on the subset of tasks it can complete. We consider the computational complexity of several problems in CSGs, such as testing if an agent is a dummy or veto agent, computing the core and core-related solution concepts, and computing power indices such as the Shapley value and Banzhaf power index.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-21
Number of pages	21
Journal	Artificial Intelligence
Volume	204
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2013.07.005
State	Published - 2013

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was partially supported by Israel Science Foundation grant # 898/05 , by Israel Ministry of Science and Technology grant # 3-6797 , and by the Google Inter-University Center for Electronic Markets and Auctions .

Keywords

Coalitional game theory
Core
Power indices

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10.1016/j.artint.2013.07.005

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title = "Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games",

abstract = "We consider a simple model of cooperation among agents called Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs). This is a restricted form of coalitional games, where each agent has a set of skills that are required to complete various tasks. Each task requires a set of skills in order to be completed, and a coalition can accomplish the task only if the coalition's agents cover the set of required skills for the task. The gain for a coalition depends only on the subset of tasks it can complete. We consider the computational complexity of several problems in CSGs, such as testing if an agent is a dummy or veto agent, computing the core and core-related solution concepts, and computing power indices such as the Shapley value and Banzhaf power index.",

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author = "Yoram Bachrach and Parkes, {David C.} and Rosenschein, {Jeffrey S.}",

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year = "2013",

doi = "10.1016/j.artint.2013.07.005",

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AU - Parkes, David C.

AU - Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

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N2 - We consider a simple model of cooperation among agents called Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs). This is a restricted form of coalitional games, where each agent has a set of skills that are required to complete various tasks. Each task requires a set of skills in order to be completed, and a coalition can accomplish the task only if the coalition's agents cover the set of required skills for the task. The gain for a coalition depends only on the subset of tasks it can complete. We consider the computational complexity of several problems in CSGs, such as testing if an agent is a dummy or veto agent, computing the core and core-related solution concepts, and computing power indices such as the Shapley value and Banzhaf power index.

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Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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