Conditional logics of belief change

Nir Friedman*, Joseph Y. Halpern

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

21 Scopus citations


The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. Belief revision and update are clearly not the only possible notions of belief change. In this paper we investigate properties of a range of possible belief change operations. We start with an abstract notion of a belief change system and provide a logical language thatdescribes belief change in such systems. We then consider several reasonable properties one can impose on such systems and characterize them axiomatically. We show that both belief revision and update fit into our classification. As a consequence, we get both a semantic and an axiomatic (proof-theoretic) characterization of belief revision and update (as well as some belief change operations that generalize them), in one natural framework.

Original languageAmerican English
Number of pages7
StatePublished - 1994
Externally publishedYes
EventProceedings of the 12th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Part 1 (of 2) - Seattle, WA, USA
Duration: 31 Jul 19944 Aug 1994


ConferenceProceedings of the 12th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Part 1 (of 2)
CitySeattle, WA, USA


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