Conflicts, interest groups, and politics in structural reforms

Avi Ben-Bassat

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

The present study is, to my knowledge, the first to examine the balance of power among all players influencing the adoption of structural reforms: politicians, regulators, and interest groups. Special attention is devoted to the effect of conflicts between regulators. Professional conflicts signal to politicians that there is a high level of risk in implementing a given reform, thereby weakening their confidence in it. Conflicts also benefit interest groups, increasing their effectiveness vis-à-vis politicians. Using a unique data set on 32 attempts to reform Israel's financial market, I find that the greater the extent of conflicts among regulators and the greater the intensity of the opposition of interest groups, the lower the probability that a reform will be approved. These conflicts, together with the strength of interest groups, have led to repeated attempts to introduce reforms, so that it takes, on average, 10 years for a reform to be adopted.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)937-952
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Law and Economics
Volume54
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2011

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Conflicts, interest groups, and politics in structural reforms'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this