Congestion games with malicious players

Moshe Babaioff*, Robert Kleinberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

44 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the equilibria of non-atomic congestion games in which there are two types of players: rational players, who seek to minimize their own delay, and malicious players, who seek to maximize the average delay experienced by the rational players. We study the existence of pure and mixed Nash equilibria for these games, and we seek to quantify the impact of the malicious players on the equilibrium. One counter intuitive phenomenon which we demonstrate is the "windfall of malice": paradoxically, when a myopically malicious player gains control of a fraction of the flow, a fraction of the players change from rational to malicious, the new equilibrium may be more favorable for the remaining rational players than the previous equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce
Pages103-112
Number of pages10
DOIs
StatePublished - 2007
Externally publishedYes
Event8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'07 - San Diego, CA, United States
Duration: 11 Jun 200715 Jun 2007

Publication series

NameEC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce

Conference

Conference8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'07
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Diego, CA
Period11/06/0715/06/07

Keywords

  • Congestion games
  • Equilibrium
  • Malicious behavior
  • Selfish routing

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