Consecutive amalgamations and an axiomatization of the Shapley value

Moshe Haviv*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

A two-axiom set is given, which characterizes the Shapley value of a game in characteristic function form. One axiom is called standard for two-person games while the other requires some consistency with respect to consecutive amalgamations of two players into one player.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)7-11
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume49
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1995

Keywords

  • Axiomatization
  • Consistency
  • Shapley value

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