Consecutive amalgamations and an axiomatization of the Shapley value

Moshe Haviv

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(94)00619-D

Consecutive amalgamations and an axiomatization of the Shapley value

Moshe Haviv^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Statistics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

A two-axiom set is given, which characterizes the Shapley value of a game in characteristic function form. One axiom is called standard for two-person games while the other requires some consistency with respect to consecutive amalgamations of two players into one player.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	7-11
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	49
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)00619-D
State	Published - Jul 1995

Keywords

Axiomatization
Consistency
Shapley value

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10.1016/0165-1765(94)00619-D

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abstract = "A two-axiom set is given, which characterizes the Shapley value of a game in characteristic function form. One axiom is called standard for two-person games while the other requires some consistency with respect to consecutive amalgamations of two players into one player.",

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Consecutive amalgamations and an axiomatization of the Shapley value

Abstract

Keywords

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