Consistent Demands for Coalition Formation

Benny Moldovanu; Eyal Winter

doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_10

Consistent Demands for Coalition Formation

Benny Moldovanu, Eyal Winter

Department of Economics

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

In equilibria of a bargaining model of coalition formation and payoff division (see Selten, 1981) players appear to form demands for their participation in a coalition. These demands have several appealing features. We characterize the sets of semi-stable and stable demand vectors for general NTU games using consistency requirements that relate the demands formed in the initial game to demands formed by subgroups considering their outside options.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Essays in Game Theory In Honor of Michael Maschler
Editors	Nimrod Megiddo
Place of Publication	New York
Publisher	Springer New York
Pages	129-140
Number of pages	12
ISBN (Electronic)	9781461226482
ISBN (Print)	9781461276210
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_10
State	Published - 1 Jan 1994

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Consistent Demands for Coalition Formation

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