TY - JOUR
T1 - Contested ground
T2 - Disentangling material and symbolic attachment to disputed territory
AU - Manekin, Devorah
AU - Grossman, Guy
AU - Mitts, Tamar
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The European Political Science Association 2018.
PY - 2019/10/1
Y1 - 2019/10/1
N2 - Territorial disputes are prone to conflict because of the value of territory to publics, whether due to its strategic and material worth, or to its intangible, symbolic value. Yet despite the implications of the distinction for both theory and policy, empirically disentangling the material from the symbolic has posed formidable methodological challenges. We propose a set of tools for assessing the nature of individual territorial attachment, drawing on a series of survey experiments in Israel. Using these tools, we find that a substantial segment of the Jewish population is attached to the disputed West Bank territory for intangible reasons, consisting not only of far-right voters but also of voters of moderate-right and centrist parties. This distribution considerably narrows the bargaining space of leaders regardless of coalitional configurations. Our empirical analysis thus illustrates how the distribution of territorial preferences in the domestic population can have powerful implications for conflict and its resolution.
AB - Territorial disputes are prone to conflict because of the value of territory to publics, whether due to its strategic and material worth, or to its intangible, symbolic value. Yet despite the implications of the distinction for both theory and policy, empirically disentangling the material from the symbolic has posed formidable methodological challenges. We propose a set of tools for assessing the nature of individual territorial attachment, drawing on a series of survey experiments in Israel. Using these tools, we find that a substantial segment of the Jewish population is attached to the disputed West Bank territory for intangible reasons, consisting not only of far-right voters but also of voters of moderate-right and centrist parties. This distribution considerably narrows the bargaining space of leaders regardless of coalitional configurations. Our empirical analysis thus illustrates how the distribution of territorial preferences in the domestic population can have powerful implications for conflict and its resolution.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85071266004&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/psrm.2018.22
DO - 10.1017/psrm.2018.22
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AN - SCOPUS:85071266004
SN - 2049-8470
VL - 7
SP - 679
EP - 697
JO - Political Science Research and Methods
JF - Political Science Research and Methods
IS - 4
ER -