Continuous stability and evolutionary convergence

Ilan Eshel*, Uzi Motro, Emilia Sansone

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

69 Scopus citations

Abstract

A stochastic process of long-term evolution due to mutation and selection is defined over an asexually reproducing population, with selection according to a population game with a one-dimensional continuity of pure strategies. Limiting the analysis to mutations of small effect, it is shown that long-term dynamic stability in such a process is equivalent to continuous stability in the relevant population game. In the case of a one-dimensional strategy set (but not necessarily if the strategy set is multi-dimensional), this result is virtually independent of the distribution of mutations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)333-343
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Theoretical Biology
Volume185
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 7 Apr 1997

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