Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain

Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We show that many-to-one matching markets with contracts where colleges’ preferences satisfy the hidden substitutes condition of Hatfield and Kominers (2015)may not be embedded, in the sense of Echenique (2012)into a Kelso and Crawford(1982)matching-with-salaries market. Our proof relies on a configurations of preferences that is observed in many college admissions markets.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)40-42
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume181
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019

Keywords

  • Matching
  • Matching with contracts
  • Matching with salaries
  • embedding

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