Iterative voting is a social choice mechanism whereby voters are allowed to continually make strategic changes to their stated preferences until no further change is desired. We study the iterative voting framework for several common voting rules and show that, for these rules, an equilibrium may never be reached. We also consider several variations of iterative voting and show that with these variations equilibrium likewise may not be reached. Finally, we present an empirical analysis of the quality of candidates elected through iterative voting.
|Original language||American English|
|Title of host publication||AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems|
|Place of Publication||Richland, SC|
|Publisher||International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)|
|Number of pages||2|
|State||Published - 2016|
|Event||15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 - Singapore, Singapore|
Duration: 9 May 2016 → 13 May 2016
|Name||Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS|
|Conference||15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016|
|Period||9/05/16 → 13/05/16|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
This research has been partly funded by Microsoft Research through its PhD Scholarship Program, and by Israel Science Foundation grant #1227/12.
Copyright © 2016, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
- Iterative voting
- Social choice