Abstract
Iterative voting is a social choice mechanism whereby voters are allowed to continually make strategic changes to their stated preferences until no further change is desired. We study the iterative voting framework for several common voting rules and show that, for these rules, an equilibrium may never be reached. We also consider several variations of iterative voting and show that with these variations equilibrium likewise may not be reached. Finally, we present an empirical analysis of the quality of candidates elected through iterative voting.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems |
| Publisher | International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS) |
| Pages | 1329-1330 |
| Number of pages | 2 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781450342391 |
| State | Published - 2016 |
| Event | 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 - Singapore, Singapore Duration: 9 May 2016 → 13 May 2016 |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS |
|---|---|
| ISSN (Print) | 1548-8403 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 1558-2914 |
Conference
| Conference | 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | Singapore |
| City | Singapore |
| Period | 9/05/16 → 13/05/16 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:Copyright © 2016, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
Keywords
- Equilibrium
- Iterative voting
- Social choice