Convergence to equilibria in Plurality voting

Reshef Meir*, Maria Polukarov, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Nicholas R. Jennings

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

76 Scopus citations

Abstract

Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of action or allocation of resources, are central to AI. In such situations, agents' individual preferences over available alternatives may vary, and they may try to reconcile these differences by voting. Based on the fact that agents may have incentives to vote strategically and misreport their real preferences, a number of recent papers have explored different possibilities for avoiding or eliminating such manipulations. In contrast to most prior work, this paper focuses on convergence of strategic behavior to a decision from which no voter will want to deviate. We consider scenarios where voters cannot coordinate their actions, but are allowed to change their vote after observing the current outcome. We focus on the Plurality voting rule, and study the conditions under which this iterative game is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium (i.e., to a decision that is stable against further unilateral manipulations). We show for the first time how convergence depends on the exact attributes of the game, such as the tie-breaking scheme, and on assumptions regarding agents' weights and strategies.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationAAAI-10 / IAAI-10 - Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 22nd Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference
PublisherAI Access Foundation
Pages823-828
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781577354659
StatePublished - 2010
Event24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 22nd Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-10 / IAAI-10 - Atlanta, GA, United States
Duration: 11 Jul 201015 Jul 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2

Conference

Conference24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 22nd Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-10 / IAAI-10
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityAtlanta, GA
Period11/07/1015/07/10

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