Convergence to Equilibria in Plurality Voting

Reshef Meir, Maria Polukarov, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Nicholas R. Jennings

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of action or allocation of resources, are central to AI. In such situations, agents' individual preferences over available alternatives may vary, and they may try to reconcile these differences by voting. Based on the fact that agents may have incentives to vote strategically and misreport their real preferences, a number of recent papers have explored different possibilities for avoiding or eliminating such manipulations. In contrast to most prior work, this paper focuses on convergence of strategic behavior to a decision from which no voter will want to deviate. We consider scenarios where voters cannot coordinate their actions, but are allowed to change their vote after observing the current outcome. We focus on the Plurality voting rule, and study the conditions under which this iterative game is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium (i.e., to a decision that is stable against further unilateral manipulations). We show for the first time how convergence depends on the exact attributes of the game, such as the tie-breaking scheme, and on assumptions regarding agents' weights and strategies.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2010
PublisherAAAI Press
Pages823-828
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781577354642
StatePublished - 15 Jul 2010
Event24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2010 - Atlanta, United States
Duration: 11 Jul 201015 Jul 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2010

Conference

Conference24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2010
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityAtlanta
Period11/07/1015/07/10

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2010, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Convergence to Equilibria in Plurality Voting'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this