TY - JOUR
T1 - Cooperation and bounded recall
AU - Aumann, Robert J.
AU - Sorin, Sylvain
PY - 1989/3
Y1 - 1989/3
N2 - A two-person game has common interests if there is a single payoff pair z that strongly Pareto dominates all other payoff pairs. Suppose such a game is repeated many times, and that each player attaches a small but positive probability to the other playing some fixed strategy with bounded recall, rather than playing to maximize his payoff. Then the resulting supergame has an equilibrium in pure strategies, and the payoffs to all such equilibria are close to optimal (i.e., to z).
AB - A two-person game has common interests if there is a single payoff pair z that strongly Pareto dominates all other payoff pairs. Suppose such a game is repeated many times, and that each player attaches a small but positive probability to the other playing some fixed strategy with bounded recall, rather than playing to maximize his payoff. Then the resulting supergame has an equilibrium in pure strategies, and the payoffs to all such equilibria are close to optimal (i.e., to z).
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34247341744&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0899-8256(89)90003-1
DO - 10.1016/0899-8256(89)90003-1
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AN - SCOPUS:34247341744
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 1
SP - 5
EP - 39
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 1
ER -