Cooperation and bounded recall

Robert J. Aumann; Sylvain Sorin

doi:10.1016/0899-8256(89)90003-1

Cooperation and bounded recall

Robert J. Aumann^*
, Sylvain Sorin

^*Corresponding author for this work

Einstein Institute of Mathematics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

160 Scopus citations

Abstract

A two-person game has common interests if there is a single payoff pair z that strongly Pareto dominates all other payoff pairs. Suppose such a game is repeated many times, and that each player attaches a small but positive probability to the other playing some fixed strategy with bounded recall, rather than playing to maximize his payoff. Then the resulting supergame has an equilibrium in pure strategies, and the payoffs to all such equilibria are close to optimal (i.e., to z).

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	5-39
Number of pages	35
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	1
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90003-1
State	Published - Mar 1989

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Cooperation and bounded recall

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