Cooptation in great power rivalries: A conceptual framework

After being rather moderate throughout the post-Cold War period, great power rivalries are gaining steam again. Yet, in contrast to past rivalries they are characterized by complex interdependencies which prompt the rivals to engage in order-building within and across rival “blocs.” We argue that this order-building is frequently done by means of “cooptation,” i.e., the trading of institutional privileges for order support. To prepare the conceptual ground for studying cooptation in great power rivalries, we conceptualize cooptation as a specific mode of cooperation and distinguish between four types: taming opposition, securing partners, seeking patronage, and wooing leaders. We demonstrate (1) how great power rivalry shapes cooptation in institutional orders; (2) that cooptation can exacerbate great power rivalry; and (3) that cooptation can tame great power rivalry under certain conditions. We thereby show that theories of cooptation, usually used to analyze domestic politics, help explain international order(ing) in great power rivalries.