Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation

Benny Moldovanu; Eyal Winter

doi:10.1016/0304-4068(94)90011-6

Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation

Benny Moldovanu, Eyal Winter^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable if and only if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for cooperation, i.e. the game is convex. This offers a characterization of a purely cooperative notion by means of a non-cooperative foundation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	533-548
Number of pages	16
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	23
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90011-6
State	Published - Nov 1994

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
* Corresponding author. Part of this research was supported by the Deutscheforschungsgemeinschaft

Keywords

Core implementation
Non-cooperative bargaining

Access to Document

10.1016/0304-4068(94)90011-6

Cite this

@article{02f76b34fe864f0fa501098a326a749e,

title = "Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation",

abstract = "In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable if and only if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for cooperation, i.e. the game is convex. This offers a characterization of a purely cooperative notion by means of a non-cooperative foundation.",

keywords = "Core implementation, Non-cooperative bargaining",

author = "Benny Moldovanu and Eyal Winter",

note = "Funding Information: * Corresponding author. Part of this research was supported by the Deutscheforschungsgemeinschaft",

year = "1994",

month = nov,

doi = "10.1016/0304-4068(94)90011-6",

language = "אנגלית",

volume = "23",

pages = "533--548",

journal = "Journal of Mathematical Economics",

issn = "0304-4068",

publisher = "Elsevier",

number = "6",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation

AU - Moldovanu, Benny

AU - Winter, Eyal

N1 - Funding Information: * Corresponding author. Part of this research was supported by the Deutscheforschungsgemeinschaft

PY - 1994/11

Y1 - 1994/11

N2 - In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable if and only if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for cooperation, i.e. the game is convex. This offers a characterization of a purely cooperative notion by means of a non-cooperative foundation.

AB - In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable if and only if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for cooperation, i.e. the game is convex. This offers a characterization of a purely cooperative notion by means of a non-cooperative foundation.

KW - Core implementation

KW - Non-cooperative bargaining

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0001611674&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/0304-4068(94)90011-6

DO - 10.1016/0304-4068(94)90011-6

M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???

AN - SCOPUS:0001611674

SN - 0304-4068

VL - 23

SP - 533

EP - 548

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

IS - 6

ER -

Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this