Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation

Benny Moldovanu, Eyal Winter*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable if and only if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for cooperation, i.e. the game is convex. This offers a characterization of a purely cooperative notion by means of a non-cooperative foundation.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)533-548
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume23
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1994

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
* Corresponding author. Part of this research was supported by the Deutscheforschungsgemeinschaft

Keywords

  • Core implementation
  • Non-cooperative bargaining

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