Correlated and coarse equilibria of single-item auctions

Michal Feldman; Brendan Lucier; Noam Nisan

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_10

Correlated and coarse equilibria of single-item auctions

Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier^*, Noam Nisan

^*Corresponding author for this work

The Rachel and Selim Benin School of Engineering and Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield full efficiency and a revenue that is at least the second-highest value. We prove that the same is true for all correlated equilibria, even those in which agents overbid – i.e., bid above their values. Coarse equilibria, in contrast, may yield lower efficiency and revenue. We show that the revenue can be as low as 26% of the second-highest value in a coarse equilibrium, even if agents are assumed not to overbid, and this is tight. We also show that when players do not overbid, the worst-case bound on social welfare at coarse equilibrium improves from 63% of the highest value to 81%, and this bound is tight as well.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Proceedings
Editors	Adrian Vetta, Yang Cai
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	131-144
Number of pages	14
ISBN (Print)	9783662541098
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_10
State	Published - 2016
Event	12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2016 - Montreal, Canada Duration: 11 Jun 2016 → 14 Jul 2016

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	10123 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2016
Country/Territory	Canada
City	Montreal
Period	11/06/16 → 14/07/16

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2016.

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_10

Cite this

Feldman, M., Lucier, B., & Nisan, N. (2016). Correlated and coarse equilibria of single-item auctions. In A. Vetta, & Y. Cai (Eds.), Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Proceedings (pp. 131-144). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 10123 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_10

Feldman, Michal ; Lucier, Brendan ; Nisan, Noam. / Correlated and coarse equilibria of single-item auctions. Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Proceedings. editor / Adrian Vetta ; Yang Cai. Springer Verlag, 2016. pp. 131-144 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

@inproceedings{6e8cfaab45384f0290ba86c237e8d8d0,

title = "Correlated and coarse equilibria of single-item auctions",

abstract = "We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield full efficiency and a revenue that is at least the second-highest value. We prove that the same is true for all correlated equilibria, even those in which agents overbid – i.e., bid above their values. Coarse equilibria, in contrast, may yield lower efficiency and revenue. We show that the revenue can be as low as 26% of the second-highest value in a coarse equilibrium, even if agents are assumed not to overbid, and this is tight. We also show that when players do not overbid, the worst-case bound on social welfare at coarse equilibrium improves from 63% of the highest value to 81%, and this bound is tight as well.",

author = "Michal Feldman and Brendan Lucier and Noam Nisan",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2016.; 12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2016 ; Conference date: 11-06-2016 Through 14-07-2016",

year = "2016",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_10",

language = "אנגלית",

isbn = "9783662541098",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",

publisher = "Springer Verlag",

pages = "131--144",

editor = "Adrian Vetta and Yang Cai",

booktitle = "Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Proceedings",

address = "גרמניה",

}

Feldman, M, Lucier, B & Nisan, N 2016, Correlated and coarse equilibria of single-item auctions. in A Vetta & Y Cai (eds), Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 10123 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 131-144, 12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2016, Montreal, Canada, 11/06/16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_10

Correlated and coarse equilibria of single-item auctions. / Feldman, Michal; Lucier, Brendan; Nisan, Noam.
Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Proceedings. ed. / Adrian Vetta; Yang Cai. Springer Verlag, 2016. p. 131-144 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 10123 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Correlated and coarse equilibria of single-item auctions

AU - Feldman, Michal

AU - Lucier, Brendan

AU - Nisan, Noam

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield full efficiency and a revenue that is at least the second-highest value. We prove that the same is true for all correlated equilibria, even those in which agents overbid – i.e., bid above their values. Coarse equilibria, in contrast, may yield lower efficiency and revenue. We show that the revenue can be as low as 26% of the second-highest value in a coarse equilibrium, even if agents are assumed not to overbid, and this is tight. We also show that when players do not overbid, the worst-case bound on social welfare at coarse equilibrium improves from 63% of the highest value to 81%, and this bound is tight as well.

AB - We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield full efficiency and a revenue that is at least the second-highest value. We prove that the same is true for all correlated equilibria, even those in which agents overbid – i.e., bid above their values. Coarse equilibria, in contrast, may yield lower efficiency and revenue. We show that the revenue can be as low as 26% of the second-highest value in a coarse equilibrium, even if agents are assumed not to overbid, and this is tight. We also show that when players do not overbid, the worst-case bound on social welfare at coarse equilibrium improves from 63% of the highest value to 81%, and this bound is tight as well.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85007325106&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_10

DO - 10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_10

M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontobookanthology.conference???

AN - SCOPUS:85007325106

SN - 9783662541098

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 131

EP - 144

BT - Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Proceedings

A2 - Vetta, Adrian

A2 - Cai, Yang

PB - Springer Verlag

T2 - 12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2016

Y2 - 11 June 2016 through 14 July 2016

ER -

Feldman M, Lucier B, Nisan N. Correlated and coarse equilibria of single-item auctions. In Vetta A, Cai Y, editors, Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2016. p. 131-144. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_10

Correlated and coarse equilibria of single-item auctions

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this