Correlated and coarse equilibria of single-item auctions

Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier*, Noam Nisan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

9 Scopus citations


We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield full efficiency and a revenue that is at least the second-highest value. We prove that the same is true for all correlated equilibria, even those in which agents overbid – i.e., bid above their values. Coarse equilibria, in contrast, may yield lower efficiency and revenue. We show that the revenue can be as low as 26% of the second-highest value in a coarse equilibrium, even if agents are assumed not to overbid, and this is tight. We also show that when players do not overbid, the worst-case bound on social welfare at coarse equilibrium improves from 63% of the highest value to 81%, and this bound is tight as well.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationWeb and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Proceedings
EditorsAdrian Vetta, Yang Cai
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Number of pages14
ISBN (Print)9783662541098
StatePublished - 2016
Event12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2016 - Montreal, Canada
Duration: 11 Jun 201614 Jul 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10123 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2016

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2016.


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