Abstract
LetPbe a correlated equilibrium distribution on the set of outcomes of a gameG. CanPbe implemented by some "cheap" pre-play procedure that does not involve a mediator? It is shown that if there are two distinct Nash equilibrium payoffs for each player inGand ifPis rational (that is, consists of probabilities which are rational numbers) and generates for each playerian expected payoff which is above her worst Nash equilibrium payoff, thenPcan be virtually implemented in a sequential equilibrium of an extended game which is generated by adding a "cheap" pre-play phase.Journal of EconomicLiterature Classification Number: C72.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 108-122 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 80 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 1998 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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