The frameworks of coverage and vacuity in formal verification analyze the effect of mutations applied to systems or their specifications. We adopt these notions to network formation games, analyzing the effect of a change in the cost of a resource. We consider two measures to be affected: the cost of the Social Optimum and extremums of costs of Nash Equilibria. Our results offer a formal framework to the effect of mutations in network formation games and include a complexity analysis of related decision problems. They also tighten the relation between algorithmic game theory and formal verification, suggesting refined definitions of coverage and vacuity for the latter.
|Original language||American English|
|Title of host publication||28th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic, CSL 2020|
|Editors||Maribel Fernandez, Anca Muscholl|
|Publisher||Schloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing|
|State||Published - Jan 2020|
|Event||28th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic, CSL 2020 - Barcelona, Spain|
Duration: 13 Jan 2020 → 16 Jan 2020
|Name||Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs|
|Conference||28th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic, CSL 2020|
|Period||13/01/20 → 16/01/20|
Bibliographical notePublisher Copyright:
© Gili Bielous and Orna Kupferman.
- Network formation games