TY - JOUR
T1 - Decision-making in Mixed Situations
T2 - An Application to Israeli-Egyptian Relations, 1956–1979
AU - Felsenthal, Dan S.
AU - Diskin, Abraham
PY - 1980/6
Y1 - 1980/6
N2 - The model of “two-dimensional mixed competitive situation” is suggested as a framework for the analysis of the Israeli-Egyptian relations during the period 1956–1979. In mixed situations it can often happen that rivals having conflicting interests and no dominant course of action, will choose the same alternative if they employ the same decision criterion for selecting among the alternatives. The above period is divided into two sub-periods. In the first sub-period, 1956–1973, the analytical framework is incorporated in the description by implication. In the second sub-period, 1973–1979, the framework is incorporated in the description explicitly. The agreements signed between Israel and Egypt since the 1973 war differ significantly from the three cease-fire agreements signed by them prior to this war. After the 1973 war the parties Were no longer interested in freezing the status quo, and both sides based their decisions on long-term orientations rather than on short-run payoffs. The common explanation to the parties’ change of behavior after the 1973 war is that they no longer faced a zero-sum conflict situation. The main goal of this paper is to show that the parties’ change of behavior can still be accounted for under the assumption of zero-sumness.
AB - The model of “two-dimensional mixed competitive situation” is suggested as a framework for the analysis of the Israeli-Egyptian relations during the period 1956–1979. In mixed situations it can often happen that rivals having conflicting interests and no dominant course of action, will choose the same alternative if they employ the same decision criterion for selecting among the alternatives. The above period is divided into two sub-periods. In the first sub-period, 1956–1973, the analytical framework is incorporated in the description by implication. In the second sub-period, 1973–1979, the framework is incorporated in the description explicitly. The agreements signed between Israel and Egypt since the 1973 war differ significantly from the three cease-fire agreements signed by them prior to this war. After the 1973 war the parties Were no longer interested in freezing the status quo, and both sides based their decisions on long-term orientations rather than on short-run payoffs. The common explanation to the parties’ change of behavior after the 1973 war is that they no longer faced a zero-sum conflict situation. The main goal of this paper is to show that the parties’ change of behavior can still be accounted for under the assumption of zero-sumness.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84948245813&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/03050628008434543
DO - 10.1080/03050628008434543
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AN - SCOPUS:84948245813
SN - 0305-0629
VL - 7
SP - 33
EP - 55
JO - International Interactions
JF - International Interactions
IS - 1
ER -