Decision making in mixed situations in which both chance and a rival player are confronted simultaneously

Abraham Diskin, Dan S. Felsenthal*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

The unfolding theory of decision making has extensively discussed competitive decision situations. However, one barely finds any discussion of mixed situations, i.e., situations in which both chance and a rival player are confronted simultaneously—especially when players are totally ignorant of the objective probabilities of the different natural states and when the formation of subjective probabilities is impossible. It is quite plausible that in two‐dimensional mixed situations (that are characteristic of most bargaining situations or noncompetitive situations in which the players' payoffs are mutually independent) the confronting rivals will end up by choosing the same alternative if they adopt the same decision criterion. Meaningful labeling of the various states of nature in symmetrical situations led respondents in an experiment to view problems confronting the rivals as asymmetrical. Many of those unfamiliar with decision theory were unlikely to employ subjective probabilities in their decision analysis even when these could be formed, and tended to employ, instead, mainly the minimax‐ maximin criterion.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)256-263
Number of pages8
JournalSystems Research and Behavioral Science
Volume23
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1978

Keywords

  • decision analysis in mixed situations
  • decision criteria
  • two‐person games

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Decision making in mixed situations in which both chance and a rival player are confronted simultaneously'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this