Decision making in mixed situations in which both chance and a rival player are confronted simultaneously

The unfolding theory of decision making has extensively discussed competitive decision situations. However, one barely finds any discussion of mixed situations, i.e., situations in which both chance and a rival player are confronted simultaneously—especially when players are totally ignorant of the objective probabilities of the different natural states and when the formation of subjective probabilities is impossible. It is quite plausible that in two‐dimensional mixed situations (that are characteristic of most bargaining situations or noncompetitive situations in which the players' payoffs are mutually independent) the confronting rivals will end up by choosing the same alternative if they adopt the same decision criterion. Meaningful labeling of the various states of nature in symmetrical situations led respondents in an experiment to view problems confronting the rivals as asymmetrical. Many of those unfamiliar with decision theory were unlikely to employ subjective probabilities in their decision analysis even when these could be formed, and tended to employ, instead, mainly the minimax‐ maximin criterion.