Diffusion of Legal Innovations: The Case of Israeli Class Actions

Christoph Engel*, Alon Klement, Keren Weinshall

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Under the standard model in law and economics, agents maximize expected profit subject to constraints set by legal rules. In such a model, the expected reaction to legal innovations is immediate. However, this is not what we observe after class actions have been introduced into Israeli law. For a long time, the new procedure was rarely utilized. Then, the adoption process gained momentum. We discuss alternative explanations for this phenomenon. We find that class action filings are explained not only by law firms' own litigation outcomes, but also by the available information about other firms' success, and their cumulative filing pattern. We thus explain the observed filing pattern by both individual and social learning, and cannot exclude mere social imitation.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)708-731
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Empirical Legal Studies
Volume15
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Cornell Law School and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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