Abstract
Human dignity is often perceived as an independent right. However, in this chapter, I provide a different account of human dignity. Particularly, I argue that the constitutional entrenchment of rights (as opposed to the mere protection of rights by statutes) is required by dignity-based concerns. Specifically, I maintain that constitutional protection of rights indicates that rights impose duties on the state; they are not a byproduct of its will or inclinations, and therefore, constitutional protection of rights is dignity-enhancing. More specifically, a constitutional bill of rights transforms and restructures the relationship between the citizens and the state in various ways. It is a form of acknowledgment that rights are not mere privileges granted to citizens; their protection is not contingent on the preferences or the judgments of the people. In the absence of constitutional entrenchment of rights, rights can be understood to be protected merely because the legislature prefers to protect them or judges them to be justified or even because judges hold them to exist. The constitutional entrenchment of rights is, therefore, qualitatively different from mere legislative protection of such rights, and such protection is required by dignity-based considerations.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Probing Human Dignity |
Subtitle of host publication | Exploring Thresholds from an Interdisciplinary Perspective |
Publisher | Springer Nature |
Pages | 61-71 |
Number of pages | 11 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9783031424373 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783031424366 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 2025 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024.