DISCO: Sidestepping RPKI's Deployment Barriers

Tomas Hlavacek, Italo Cunha, Yossi Gilad, Amir Herzberg, Ethan Katz-Bassett, Michael Schapira, Haya Shulman

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

BGP is a gaping security hole in today's Internet, as evidenced by numerous Internet outages and blackouts, repeated traffic hijacking, and surveillance incidents. To protect against prefix hijacking, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) has been standardized. Yet, despite Herculean efforts, ubiquitous deployment of the RPKI remains distant, due to RPKI's manual and error-prone certification process. We argue that deploying origin authentication at scale requires substituting the standard requirement of certifying legal ownership of IP address blocks with the goal of certifying de facto ownership. We show that settling for de facto ownership is sufficient for protecting against hazardous prefix hijacking and can be accomplished without requiring any changes to today's routing infrastructure. We present DISCO, a readily deployable system that automatically certifies de facto ownership and generates the appropriate BGP-path-filtering rules at routers. We evaluate DISCO's security and deployability via live experiments on the Internet using a prototype implementation of DISCO and through simulations on empirically-derived datasets. To facilitate the reproducibility of our results, we open source our prototype, simulator, and measurement analysis code [30].

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publication27th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2020
PublisherThe Internet Society
ISBN (Electronic)1891562614, 9781891562617
DOIs
StatePublished - 2020
Event27th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2020 - San Diego, United States
Duration: 23 Feb 202026 Feb 2020

Publication series

Name27th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2020

Conference

Conference27th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2020
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Diego
Period23/02/2026/02/20

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 27th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2020. All Rights Reserved.

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