TY - JOUR
T1 - Discrete-time strategic job arrivals to a single machine with waiting and lateness penalties
AU - Alon, Tzvi
AU - Haviv, Moshe
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2022/11/16
Y1 - 2022/11/16
N2 - A single machine processes a random number of identical jobs on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis. Processing times are independent and identically distributed with a general integral distribution. Each job is held by a strategic player who needs to choose a time slot to arrive at. The individual objective is to reduce the sum of two types of linear in time costs: lateness and waiting. The resulting decision making model is, then, a symmetric non-cooperative game. We derive a symmetric Nash equilibrium for this game, and discuss its structural properties.
AB - A single machine processes a random number of identical jobs on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis. Processing times are independent and identically distributed with a general integral distribution. Each job is held by a strategic player who needs to choose a time slot to arrive at. The individual objective is to reduce the sum of two types of linear in time costs: lateness and waiting. The resulting decision making model is, then, a symmetric non-cooperative game. We derive a symmetric Nash equilibrium for this game, and discuss its structural properties.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85126064727&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.02.032
DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.02.032
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AN - SCOPUS:85126064727
SN - 0377-2217
VL - 303
SP - 480
EP - 486
JO - European Journal of Operational Research
JF - European Journal of Operational Research
IS - 1
ER -