Discrete-time strategic job arrivals to a single machine with waiting and lateness penalties

Tzvi Alon*, Moshe Haviv

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

A single machine processes a random number of identical jobs on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis. Processing times are independent and identically distributed with a general integral distribution. Each job is held by a strategic player who needs to choose a time slot to arrive at. The individual objective is to reduce the sum of two types of linear in time costs: lateness and waiting. The resulting decision making model is, then, a symmetric non-cooperative game. We derive a symmetric Nash equilibrium for this game, and discuss its structural properties.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)480-486
Number of pages7
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume303
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 16 Nov 2022

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier B.V.

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