Dividend stickiness and strategic pooling

Ilan Guttman, Ohad Kadan*, Eugene Kandel

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

85 Scopus citations

Abstract

We argue that dividend stickiness, the tendency of managers to keep dividends unchanged, implies that managers use a partially pooling dividend policy. We offer a model that demonstrates how such a policy can evolve endogenously in equilibrium. An informed manager who cares about the firm's intrinsic value as well as short-term stock price allocates earnings between investments and dividends. We show that there is a continuum of equilibria in which the dividend is constant for a range of realized earnings. Compared with the standard separating equilibrium, this partial pooling behavior induces higher firm value and lower underinvestment. We offer new empirical implications relating the pooling nature of dividend stickiness to the information environment of the firm, dividend prediction models, managerial incentives, and investment.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)4455-4495
Number of pages41
JournalReview of Financial Studies
Volume23
Issue number12
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2010

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