Abstract
Recently, scholars of Jewish law who wished to characterize the workings of Jewish law turned to Ronald Dworkin’s writings for inspiration. The Talmudic doctrine of judicial error is based primarily on a procedural test, not a substantive one. The Mishnah distinguishes between a learned individual and a layman. The lack of coherence, the difficulties, and the complications that the Talmudic Sages retain also indicates their approach to the question of lacunae. Invoking the doctrine of mistake implies taking on a judgmental role regarding past decisions, and undermining positions with which one does not agree. The Talmudic discourse that is committed to the ideal of “both are the words of the living God” differs markedly from the discourse of error. Controversy, the hallmark of Talmudic legal culture, allows (and encourages) diverse views to remain within the system, whether or not they are accepted, without requiring that they be labeled “mistaken”; in other words, it allows divergent views to be tolerated.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Jewish Law Annual |
Subtitle of host publication | Volume 22 |
Publisher | Taylor and Francis |
Pages | 25-36 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Volume | 22 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781317200413 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781138674745 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2024 Institute for Research in Jewish Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.