Abstract
We present eclipse attacks on bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network. Our attack allows an adversary controlling a sufficient number of IP addresses to monopolize all connections to and from a victim bitcoin node. The attacker can then exploit the victim for attacks on bitcoin’s mining and consensus system, including N-confirmation double spending, selfish mining, and adversarial forks in the blockchain. We take a detailed look at bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network, and quantify the resources involved in our attack via probabilistic analysis, Monte Carlo simulations, measurements and experiments with live bitcoin nodes. Finally, we present countermeasures, inspired by botnet architectures, that are designed to raise the bar for eclipse attacks while preserving the openness and decentralization of bitcoin’s current network architecture.
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Security Symposium |
| Publisher | USENIX Association |
| Pages | 129-144 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781931971232 |
| State | Published - 2015 |
| Event | 24th USENIX Security Symposium - Washington, United States Duration: 12 Aug 2015 → 14 Aug 2015 |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Security Symposium |
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Conference
| Conference | 24th USENIX Security Symposium |
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| Country/Territory | United States |
| City | Washington |
| Period | 12/08/15 → 14/08/15 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2015 Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Security Symposium. All rights reserved.