Economic efficiency requires interaction

Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

38 Scopus citations


We study the necessity of interaction between individuals for obtaining approximately efficient economic allocations. We view this as a formalization of Hayek's classic point of view that focuses on the information transfer advantages that markets have relative to centralized planning. We study two settings: combinatorial auctions with unit demand bidders (bipartite matching) and combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. In both settings we provethat non-interactive protocols require exponentially larger communication costs than interactive ones, even those that only use a modest amount of interaction.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationSTOC 2014 - Proceedings of the 2014 ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Number of pages10
ISBN (Print)9781450327107
StatePublished - 2014
Event4th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2014 - New York, NY, United States
Duration: 31 May 20143 Jun 2014

Publication series

NameProceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
ISSN (Print)0737-8017


Conference4th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2014
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew York, NY


  • Auctions
  • Communication complexity
  • Matching


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