Efficiency and stability of a financial architecture with too-interconnected-to-fail institutions

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

60 Scopus citations

Abstract

The regulation of large interconnected financial institutions has become a key policy issue. To improve financial stability, regulators have proposed limiting banks’ size and interconnectedness. I estimate a network-based model of the over-the-counter interbank lending market in the US and quantify the efficiency-stability implications of this policy. Trading efficiency decreases with limits on interconnectedness because the intermediation chains become longer. While restricting the interconnectedness of banks improves stability, the effect is non-monotonic. Stability also improves with higher liquidity requirements, when banks have access to liquidity during the crisis, and when failed banks’ depositors maintain confidence in the banking system.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)113-146
Number of pages34
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Volume124
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Apr 2017
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

  • Contagion risk
  • Federal funds market
  • Financial regulation
  • Networks
  • Trading efficiency

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Efficiency and stability of a financial architecture with too-interconnected-to-fail institutions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this