Efficient tournaments within teams

Alex Gershkov*, Jianpei Li, Paul Schweinzer

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

30 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is a partial and noisy ranking which specifies who comes first in efforts among the competing partners. This enables us to ensure both first-best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output only among partners. Our efficiency result is obtained for a wide range of cost and production functions.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)103-119
Number of pages17
JournalRAND Journal of Economics
Volume40
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009
Externally publishedYes

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