Efficient tournaments within teams

Alex Gershkov; Jianpei Li; Paul Schweinzer

doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00057.x

Efficient tournaments within teams

Alex Gershkov^*
, Jianpei Li
, Paul Schweinzer

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

34 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is a partial and noisy ranking which specifies who comes first in efforts among the competing partners. This enables us to ensure both first-best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output only among partners. Our efficiency result is obtained for a wide range of cost and production functions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	103-119
Number of pages	17
Journal	RAND Journal of Economics
Volume	40
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00057.x
State	Published - 2009
Externally published	Yes

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10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00057.x

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AB - We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is a partial and noisy ranking which specifies who comes first in efforts among the competing partners. This enables us to ensure both first-best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output only among partners. Our efficiency result is obtained for a wide range of cost and production functions.

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Efficient tournaments within teams

Abstract

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