@inproceedings{a58de5d59595448c91931aae240f5d11,
title = "Elections can be manipulated often",
abstract = "The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method among at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method among 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.",
author = "Ehud Friedgut and Gil Kalai and Noam Nisan",
year = "2008",
doi = "10.1109/FOCS.2008.87",
language = "American English",
isbn = "9780769534367",
series = "Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS",
pages = "243--249",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2008",
note = "49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2008 ; Conference date: 25-10-2008 Through 28-10-2008",
}