TY - GEN
T1 - Elections can be manipulated often
AU - Friedgut, Ehud
AU - Kalai, Gil
AU - Nisan, Noam
PY - 2008
Y1 - 2008
N2 - The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method among at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method among 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.
AB - The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method among at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method among 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=57949102175&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/FOCS.2008.87
DO - 10.1109/FOCS.2008.87
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontobookanthology.conference???
AN - SCOPUS:57949102175
SN - 9780769534367
T3 - Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS
SP - 243
EP - 249
BT - Proceedings of the 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2008
T2 - 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2008
Y2 - 25 October 2008 through 28 October 2008
ER -