@inproceedings{a58de5d59595448c91931aae240f5d11,

title = "Elections can be manipulated often",

abstract = "The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method among at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method among 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.",

author = "Ehud Friedgut and Gil Kalai and Noam Nisan",

year = "2008",

doi = "10.1109/FOCS.2008.87",

language = "American English",

isbn = "9780769534367",

series = "Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS",

pages = "243--249",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2008",

note = "49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2008 ; Conference date: 25-10-2008 Through 28-10-2008",

}